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This is the story of three clinic students and the mark they 
made on New Jersey law. Really, it is a story about students trying to 
seize kairos, the opportune moment in time to effectuate change.  
In Greek myth, two spirits represented different aspects of 
time: Chronos and Kairos. Both had wings and long hair growing 
only out of their faces—not on the tops or backs of their heads—
symbolizing the ability of a person to seize time as it approached but 
not as it passed by. Chronos was the spirit representing the sequential 
and linear passage of time, and is often depicted as older,1 whereas 
                                                     
 * Clinical Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School (known as Rutgers 
School of Law–Camden until the editing stages of this Article). Thanks to Mark 
Gulbranson, Esq.; Mark Natale, Esq.; and Logan Elliott Pettigrew, Esq.; the 2013 
graduates who wrote the brief for amici curiae in 2013, granted permission to talk 
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Kairos is shown as young, floating on air in a circuitous path. He was 
the spirit of opportune moments—of possibilities.2 Thus, the concept 
of kairos in rhetoric centers on the opportune moment or the “right 
time and place.”3  
The “opportune moment” concept of kairos has been part of 
rhetoric since the time of Aristotle, who took the view that the 
moment in time in which an argument was delivered dictated the 
type of rhetorical devices that would be most effective.4 The sophists 
took a different view: Kairos is something to be manipulated by the 
speaker as part of adapting the audience’s interpretation of the 
current situation. Kairos assists the speaker in molding the 
persuasive message the speaker is communicating.5 Modern 
rhetoricians hold a middle view—that a speaker must be inventive 
and fluid because there can never be more than a contingent 
management of a present opportunity.6 
The Greek word kairos and its translation “opportune moment” 
embody two distinct concepts communicated through metaphors. 
The first concept, the derivation of the “right moment” half of the 
definition, is temporal. Greek mythology concentrated the spirit on 
                                                                                                                
about their story at the Michigan State Law Review 2015 Spring Symposium, 
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reflected on the experience in interviews, and rolled up their sleeves to offer revising 
and editing suggestions. Thanks also to Professor Victoria L. Chase, the clinical 
professor who taught the students in their first clinic semester and who shared the 
delight of working with these students during the amicus brief project while we co-
taught the advanced clinic course in the spring 2013 semester. My appreciation to 
these people who kindly spent time reading and providing feedback and talking to 
me about ideas: Steve Johansen, Ken Chestek, Joan Ames Magat, Kristen K. 
Tiscione, and Steve Robbins. Last, my very special thanks to John Pollock, Esq., at 
the Public Justice Center and the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel for 
his help throughout the preparation of the presentation and writing of this Article.  
 1. Our image of Father Time, although several paintings and sculptures 
depict Chronos with wings.  
 2. See, e.g., Francesco Salviati, Kairos (1552-1554) (fresco); 
CALLISTRATUS, DESCRIPTIONS 6 (Arthur Fairbanks trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1931) 
(circa fourth century CE), http://www.theoi.com/Text/Callistratus.html (describing a 
Fourth Century B.C.E. bronze statue of Kairos by Lysippus standing at Sicyon as 
“resplendent with the bloom of youth” and reddening cheeks). 
 3. Carolyn R. Miller, Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science, in A RHETORIC OF 
DOING: ESSAYS ON WRITTEN DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 310, 312-
13 (Stephen P. Witte, Neil Nakadate & Roger D. Cherry eds., 1992).  
 4. James Kinneavy & Catherine Eskin, Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 17 
WRITTEN COMM. 432, 436-38 (2000).  
 5. ERIC CHARLES WHITE, KAIRONOMIA: ON THE WILL-TO-INVENT 14-15 
(1987). 
 6. Id. at 13.  
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the temporal. But, the second half of the definition—the 
opportunity—is spatial.7 To seize the opportunity at the right time 
requires one to be in the right place and under the right 
circumstances—including those of the situation and those of the 
actor. Rhetoricians commonly use visualizations of the penetrable 
openings needed for both the successful passage of the arrows of 
archery through loopholes in solid walls, and the productive shuttles 
of weaving through the warp yarns in fabric, as a way to describe the 
spatial aspect of kairos.8 Modern rhetoric takes these metaphors and 
elaborates, defining kairos as “a passing instant when an opening 
appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be 
achieved.”9 The idea is one of force and power.  
Seeing an opportune moment in time to call attention to a legal 
issue they identified as important, the three third-year law students in 
this story wrote, as amici curiae, a brief in support of petition for 
certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court on the issue of 
whether indigent litigants in civil domestic violence cases have the 
right to court-appointed attorneys. They prepared this brief under the 
guidance of their clinical professors during the last weeks of their 
third year of law school, when many of their classmates were 
wrapping up their work and taking a relaxing breath.  
In civil rights advocacy, lawyers must choose not only the right 
arguments, but also the right moment for the argument. These 
students and their professors believed the timing was right to argue 
that indigent litigants involved in the New Jersey domestic violence 
restraining order process have a legal right to court-appointed 
counsel as a requirement of equal access to a fair trial. The issue had 
been briefly raised several years earlier by a defendant who had 
questioned the constitutionality of New Jersey’s Prevention of 
Domestic Violence Act. However, the right to counsel issue had 
been completely disregarded by the courts, and no state-based 
advocacy groups pursued the issue.  
These students, in contrast, saw something to the issue that 
other advocates had missed. Moreover, they saw it at the right time 
in their own legal education to act on it, compellingly.  
It is fair for readers to know up front that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ultimately denied certification in the matter.10 So, 
                                                     
 7. Miller, supra note 3, at 313. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. D.N. v. K.M., 83 A.3d 825, 826 (N.J. 2014).  
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why bother reading any further? For that matter, why does this 
Article exist at all? Because, instead of summarily denying 
certification without comment, as it normally does, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court took the unusual step of publishing an opinion 
explaining the reasons for denying certification. Perhaps more 
importantly, one justice went further, taking the even rarer step of 
publishing a dissent to the denial of certification. His dissent ran 
several pages.11 The surrounding circumstances permit a reasonable 
inference that the students’ arguments contributed to the court’s 
decision-making processes. Both the opinion and the dissent 
reference arguments contained in the amicus brief. That, the paucity 
of law in other states at the time, and the brevity petitioning party’s 
papers, point to the amicus brief as the most substantial document 
arguing the merits. 
The students’ story, thus, is not a story with an unhappy 
ending: It is a story of beginnings. The students’ persuasion helped 
experienced lawyers see the importance of maintaining this new 
civil-rights advocacy effort in state court—something that was 
relatively extraordinary for law students to do given the normative 
law school emphasis on federal law cases and established rules of 
law. Further, the substance of the published opinion and dissent 
highlights the rhetorical situation of the brief: a particular historical 
moment in the political and financial landscape of New Jersey. It 
provides an interesting lesson that the right arguments, made by the 
right people, but written and submitted at what turned out to be the 
wrong time, can nevertheless create an opening for a later kairic 
moment.12  
In the rhetoric of kairos, when an opportune moment is 
missed—whether because of the wrong timing, a lack of force, or a 
                                                     
 11. Id. (Albin, J., dissenting). The dissent was three and one-half pages long 
in the Atlantic 3d Reporter, i.e., it ended on page 829. Legal databases are not set up 
to easily search for other instances of dissents related to denials of certifications. 
After some trial and error with digests, tables, and electronic databases, I found only 
one other case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court published an opinion and 
accompanying dissent as part of a denial of certification. State v. Farinich, 446 A.2d 
120, 120 (N.J. 1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting). There are also two decisions I found 
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the certification was 
improvidently granted, and in which a Justice issued a separate opinion. Reuter v. 
Borough Council, 796 A.2d 843, 843 (N.J. 2002) (Long, J., dissenting); Mahony v. 
Davis, 469 A.2d 31, 31 (N.J. 1983) (Handler, J., concurring). Thank you to Melissa 
Gorsline at LexisNexis and to Professor Genevieve Tung, Research Librarian, 
Rutgers Law School, for shadowing me on these searches.  
 12. Miller, supra note 3, at 313.  
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missed target—all is not lost because the spirit Kairos is not confined 
to Chronos’ linear path, but may reappear at the same location again. 
For that reason, Professor Linda Berger has suggested that the 
temporal and spatial metaphors may still be useful. What may look 
like missed opportunity may still have yielded enough success to 
snag a thread in the weave that can later be pulled to unravel the 
existing fabric of the social sky when the moment is right and the 
opportunity next presents itself.13 And, that is precisely what has 
happened in the case of these three third-year law students and their 
brief filed as amici curiae. They created initial stray threads in the 
fabric of existing New Jersey domestic violence law that can be 
tugged in the future.  
I. THE RIGHT WRITERS: MEET THE THREE 3LS  
The combined energy and skill set of these three students were 
critical components to the strategy and persuasion of this amicus 
brief. Had this been a different group of students, the project very 
likely would have ended over a cup of coffee. But all three of the 
students were among the most academically successful students in 
their class, balancing doctrinal knowledge and client-centered 
writing competency. They had law journal, law firm, and judicial 
internship experiences to draw upon. They studied persuasion theory 
and some rhetoric in their second year of law school as part of an 
experimental overhaul of our intramural moot court program.14 
Coincidentally—if one believes in coincidences—the moot court 
simulation that the students wrote about and argued was set in the 
New Jersey Supreme Court and explored aspects of state and federal 
guarantees of the right to a fair trial. In their third year, these students 
served as teaching assistants to the selected students in the second 
                                                     
 13. See Linda L. Berger, Creating Kairos at the Supreme Court: The 
Judicial Construction of Right Moments, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 7) (on file with author). Part of this metaphor was relayed at 
Professor Berger’s presentation on the same topic at the Fourth Biennial Applied 
Legal Storytelling Conference. Linda Berger, Professor, William S. Boyd Sch. of 
Law, Presentation at the Fourth Biennial Applied Legal Storytelling Conference at 
the City University Law School (July 2013) (materials on file). 
 14. The fall semester course was based on the course created by Michael R. 
Smith in his textbook, MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES 
AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (2d. ed. 2008), combined with other 
readings on persuasion and rhetoric written by legal writing and clinical scholars.  
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year of the program.15 In short, these three students were among the 
most prepared the law school could offer in terms of written 
advocacy capabilities. Beyond that, each of the students brought 
other knowledge bases to the project.  
 Logan Elliott Pettigrew worked on a pro bono amicus brief at 
a law firm between his second and third years of law school. 
His legal research skills were particularly well honed for 
someone at his level, described by one of the firm’s partners as 
“uncanny.”16 Among his peers and the clinical faculty, Mr. 
Pettigrew was also well-known for his work ethic, his writing, 
and his attention to procedural details. He volunteered in 
several administrative capacities in the law school, including in 
the admissions department, and he served as a student 
representative at recruitment fairs where very few law students 
were present. For reasons explained below, the recruitment of 
students was of particular and critical significance in the 2012–
2013 academic year at Rutgers–Camden.  
 Mark Gulbranson interned between his second and third years 
of law school for a Superior Court judge assigned to the Family 
Part, and as a result witnessed over one hundred domestic 
violence trials. In one of his law school courses, Mr. 
Gulbranson wrote a brief set in New Jersey domestic violence 
law.17 These experiences gave him a foundation in many of the 
documents used by the courts in domestic violence, including a 
procedure manual and directives. Mark also had a special 
interest in the art and form of writing and had moved beyond 
the often-rigid paradigms of first-year students by the fall of his 
second year when his fluid style took shape.  
 Mark Natale was passionate about civil rights and during 
interviews for this Article remained so. He was the person most 
invested, initially, in the merits of the issues and inspired 
everyone else to become so. Mr. Natale excelled in his trial-
advocacy course and thought like a trial attorney, something 
that became important knowledge to draw upon as he wrote his 
section of the legal argument. In his second year of law school, 
                                                     
15. Mr. Pettigrew was the student chairperson of the moot court program in 
his 3L year. Between the clinic work and the advanced writing course, there was 
quite a lot of talk about persuasion in written advocacy.  
16. Comment made by Barbara Gotthelf in her thanks, Barbara K. Gotthelf, 
The Lawyer’s Guide to Um, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1, 1 n.* (2014).  
17. His first-year legal writing course (i.e., using a simulation trial 
transcript and exhibits that I wrote or created). 
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Mr. Natale and his moot court partner (Mr. Pettigrew) had won 
the oral argument competition in the law school’s intramural 
moot court program.  
The students also knew the professors very well. I taught Mr. 
Gulbranson in each of his six semesters of law school, and Mr. 
Natale and Mr. Pettigrew in five semesters. Professor Victoria Chase 
taught all three students in the Domestic Violence Clinic their second 
year and had occasion to work with them individually for a few 
hours prior to that as part of our integrated lawyering program. The 
depth of the teaching relationships meant that Professor Chase and I 
had a great deal of trust in their capabilities: We treated them as 
colleagues during the briefing process.  
In addition to their educational experiences in their casebook, 
clinic, and legal writing courses, historical factors affecting the law 
school also may have played a role in shaping this trio of students’ 
desire to contribute, even as the clock ticked down to graduation. 
The students of the 2013 Class were a motivated and talented group 
already, but this class worked to distinguish itself. At the time of 
graduation, the list of accomplishments of class members was long 
and memorable.18 If it appeared that students might have been trying 
to prove themselves over and above, there was a reason for that. The 
Class of 2013 at Rutgers School of Law–Camden found itself tossed 
in a political maelstrom at the very midpoint of their law school 
tenure, and the rest of their time in law school was one marked by 
the distraction of those politics, coupled with brand-confusion and 
swirling questions from outsiders about whether Rutgers–Camden 
even existed anymore. 
On January 25, 2012, Governor Chris Christie stunned the law-
school community when he announced during a press conference 
that, as part of a plan to restructure medical education in New Jersey, 
Rutgers–Camden would become part of Rowan University, a 
regional school in southern New Jersey. Under the plan, the regional 
school would be elevated to a research university, in part with the 
gift of the Camden campus of Rutgers University—the southern third 
of the Rutgers’ system. The main campus of Rutgers University, in 
return, would receive components of the remnants of the University 
of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey closest to New 
                                                     
 18. Students in the class published seven expanded issues of the main law 
journal in one year to cure a backlog of almost three volumes; started a 501(c)(3) 
pro bono program; and worked on more high-stakes matters and wrote more briefs 
in the clinical programs than the clinicians could keep up with when it came time to 
select honors at graduation.  
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Brunswick.19 Not known for hesitation, Governor Christie announced 
this would all happen by the end of the legislative term and that 
Rutgers–Camden would be merged with Rowan at that time.20 There 
was no warning on the Rutgers–Camden campus leading to this 
announcement: It was a thunderbolt to staff and the student body 
alike. As the story unfolded, it appeared that the Rutgers University 
president had resigned himself to this plan21 and that legislators in 
our own county were falling into line with the Democratic leaders 
even though the net effect could economically hurt the county. What 
followed was a decision by the Rutgers–Camden chancellor to fight 
this announcement, and six months of grassroots campaigning, legal 
research, editorials, campaigning, and the retention of a nationally 
known attorney to represent the University Trustees who also 
opposed the action. During this time, there was a great deal of 
uncertainty about the future of the campus.22 The law school’s 
national reputation was in particular jeopardy, and admissions 
plummeted dramatically.23 Faculty and students fielded constant 
questions about the merger, and many people thought it had already 
taken place. All of this contributed to members of the Class of 
2013’s commitment to proving they were still students of national 
caliber. 
                                                     
 19. See Press Release, Chris Christie, Governor, New Jersey, Governor 
Chris Christie Outlines Blueprint to Transform Medical Education in the State and 
Make New Jersey a National Leader (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.state.nj.us/ 
governor/news/news/552012/approved/20120125b.html. Other news agencies also 
covered the story of the press conference. See, e.g., Geoff Mulvihill, Christie Seeks 
Rowan Takeover of Rutgers-Camden, NBC PHILA. (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:41 PM), 
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Christie-Seeks-Rowan-Takeover-of-
Rutgers-Camden-138053583.html; Mark J. Magyar, Christie Calls for Restructuring 
of Research Universities, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.njspotlight. 
com/stories/12/0126/0025/.  
 20. See Kevin Riordan, Christie Fast-Tracking Rutgers-Rowan Merger?, 
PHILLY.COM (Oct. 17, 2012, 9:32 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inq-
blinq/Fast-track-for-Rowan-Rutgers-merger.html; Gov. Christie Says Rutgers-
Camden Will Lose Its Name When It Merges with Rowan University, PRESS 
ATLANTIC CITY.COM (Apr. 11, 2012, 7:59 PM), www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/ 
breaking/gov-christie-says-rutgers-camden-will-lose-its-name-when/article_ 
320d1d8c-8432-11e1-9720-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 21. See Perry Dane, Allan R. Stein & Robert F. Williams, Saving Rutgers–
Camden, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 337, 340-41 (2014).  
 22. See id. at 356-72.  
 23. See id. at 355. The law school received only 25% of the applications it 
normally would have received during that year. Even with the downturn in law 
school applications nationwide, this was unprecedented and was attributed to the 
uncertainty caused by the announcement. The numbers stabilized the following year.  
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II. THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES: THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
RESTRAINING ORDER HEARING SYSTEM IN NEW JERSEY  
The students’ efforts related to parties’ access to counsel at 
hearings for domestic violence final restraining orders in New 
Jersey. Those hearings are governed by the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act of 1991.24 Final Restraining Order (FRO) hearings are 
civil actions conducted in the Family Part of the Superior Court as 
bench trials and occur seven to ten days after the plaintiff files a 
complaint.25 The complaint performs double duty—at once providing 
notice to the defendant and acting as a request to the court for the 
protection of a temporary restraining order (TRO).26 The courts are 
always open for these matters. Depending on the day and time, a 
TRO may be issued at the time the application is filed, as determined 
by a superior court hearing officer, superior court judge, or 
municipal judge. The abbreviated time between the entry of a TRO 
and the scheduled hearing for an FRO is designed deliberately for 
speed, which in turn provides maximum safety to the plaintiff. It is 
also intended to be equitable to the defendant, as quick, pro se 
summary dispositions theoretically offset the potential disruption 
caused by the ex parte TRO. Entry of a TRO limits the defendant’s 
ability to access the family home, contact family members, access 
personal property (the defendant will typically have a few minutes, 
escorted, to collect some personal belongings), and possess 
firearms—including any service weapons needed for employment 
purposes, e.g., police officer.27  
But, despite the initial notion that the Act had created a simple 
method that allowed matters to be handled by the parties themselves 
appearing pro se, asking indigent parties to navigate the system 
without the benefit of a right to court-appointed counsel has become 
increasingly problematic. The trial procedure of the final restraining 
order hearing has evolved in its legal and procedural complexity. At 
the trial to determine whether the TRO restraining order should be 
converted to an FRO, parties are expected to collect and bring any 
physical or documentary evidence they may have without the benefit 
of formal discovery,28 to authenticate any of the evidence as 
necessary, to issue subpoenas for witnesses to appear in advance of 
                                                     
 24. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to -35 (West 2015). 
 25. § 2C:25-29. 
 26. § 2C:25-28. 
 27. § 2C:25-28(f)-(j). 
 28. N.J. CT. R. 5:5-1 (West 2015). 
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the hearing,29 and to provide proper notice of any amendments to the 
complaint or motions. During the hearing itself, the pro se parties 
solicit testimony, cross-examine, object, and argue their cases in any 
closing statements—all of which is subject to the full body of the 
New Jersey Rules of Evidence.  
The legal tests and standards trial courts must apply are no 
longer as simple as imagined when the Act was first enacted, but 
have increased over time since the passage of the Act. By way of 
illustration, approximately 200 published cases discuss issues related 
to just the entry of restraining orders.30 As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court recognized in 2011, constitutional due process and notice 
considerations apply in these cases just as in any other.31 The cases 
also require parties to present or refute evidence about a history of 
domestic violence and to argue that the history is related or not to the 
predicate acts of violence.32 Last, the parties must engage in an 
inferential analysis of whether the plaintiff “needs” a restraining 
order.33 What serves as an excellent and manageable learning 
challenge for third-year law students in a clinic setting often may be 
overwhelming to unrepresented parties who have little or no 
familiarity with legal proceedings.  
The risk factors in these matters are very real for both parties. 
The plaintiff has made a calculated gamble of exposure and possible 
financial and community pressures by filing the action. The plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving the prima facie case in the action.34 If the 
plaintiff loses, he or she faces the possibility of returning home to 
that defendant after the plaintiff has publicly announced the abuse, 
and after subjecting the defendant to eviction, expense, and potential 
stigma. For the plaintiff, the hearing itself poses some high-stakes 
hazards. By succeeding, she or he will secure some protections to 
live independently and safely, with the promise of assistance of 
heightened police intervention. By losing, she or he will be at the 
                                                     
 29. N.J. CT. R. 1:9-1 to -2. 
 30. Per a search done for cases that cited the section of the statute 
governing the entry of a Final Restraining Order. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-19, -28,  
-29. 
 31. See J.D. v. M.D.F., 25 A.3d 1045, 1057 (N.J. 2011) (citing H.E.S. v. 
J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 412-13 (N.J. 2003)). 
 32. See Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 395 (N.J. 1998).  
 33. See J.D., 25 A.3d at 1062 (citing Silver v. Silver, 903 A.2d 446, 456 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)).  
 34. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a). The evidentiary standard makes the 
burden of proof on the plaintiff abundantly clear, “the standard for proving the 
allegations in the complaint shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 
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most vulnerable point—at the mercy of a defendant who has just 
succeeded.  
The entrance of an FRO leaves a defendant subject to twenty 
different types of permanent relief—twenty different 
consequences—that the court may order.35 Many of those twenty 
types of consequences will have already happened upon the entry of 
a TRO—such as the seizure of any weapons and the defendant’s 
ejection from the home shared with the plaintiff, with only a short 
time under police escort to collect some personal belongings.36 
Further, with the entry of an FRO, the Act, in two places, attaches a 
stigmatizing phrase for the defendant, branding that person as an 
“attacker.”37 The courts have also referred to these defendants as 
“batterers.”38 By law, the stigmatizing label of “attacker” is made 
permanent by entry into the Domestic Violence Registry along with 
the defendant’s fingerprints.39 Other examples of consequences that 
attach at the time of the FRO include monetary fines, more 
permanent custody or support provisions, the possibility of 
mandatory psychological evaluations, and the possibility of 
mandatory counseling.40  
Abbreviated time frames such as these summary proceedings 
make FRO hearings an excellent learning vehicle for third-year law 
students who wish to participate in a trial-practice clinic. There are 
few other areas of law where law students in a clinical setting may 
shepherd multiple cases from start to conclusion in the space of three 
months. The clinic is purposely narrow in its scope, with the goal of 
affording each team the opportunity to take several cases from start 
to completion in a semester. Law students work in teams 
representing plaintiffs in civil restraining order hearings—the New 
Jersey FRO system—and in matters closely related to those FRO 
hearings. The student representation typically begins when a case is 
referred to the clinic after the entry of the TRO, and the preparation 
                                                     
 35. See § 2C:25-29b.(1)-(12), (14)-(18); § 2C:25-29.4; § 2C:25-29.1; 
§ 2C:25-30.  
 36. § 2C:25-28(j), (k). These consequences, broadly speaking, range on 
limitations on liberty, monetary consequences, loss of right to occupy a residence, 
possess a weapon, or see one’s children. Direct parallels were drawn in the amicus 
brief. 
 37. §§ 2C:25-21, 23.  
 38. See, e.g., D.N. v. K.M., 83 A.3d 825, 829 (N.J. 2014); Wildoner v. 
Borough of Ramsey, 744 A.2d 1146, 1158 (N.J. 2000).  
 39. § 2C:25-34. 
 40. § 2C:25-29(b). 
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time is limited to approximately two or possibly three weeks 
assuming the trial court grants a request of a short continuance.41  
Enrolling in the Domestic Violence Clinic is a weighty time 
commitment for the students. There is no prerequisite that students 
know either domestic violence law or courtroom skills prior to 
enrolling. Rather, beyond those of the student-practice court rule,42 
the only prerequisites are the Evidence and Professional 
Responsibility courses. The bottom line is that in one semester, 
students are expected to learn the area of law and the basics of the 
dynamics of abuse, to learn courtroom techniques if they do not 
already know them, to prepare a case for a bench trial in a time-
pressured situation, to handle ancillary matters such as custody and 
support, and ultimately to represent a client during a difficult time in 
the client’s life. Students find the experience to be intense and 
challenging but achievable. Prior to any court appearance, they have 
multiple meetings with the supervising clinical professor as well as a 
moot with class members—all with the opportunity for feedback. 
They also know that there is a licensed and seasoned attorney in 
court with them at all times. It is a popular clinic for students 
interested in trial work.  
A. The Right Situation: The Cross-Complaints in the D.N. v. K.M. 
Case  
Against this backdrop, in early 2013 these three clinic students 
learned of a woman, D.N., who in December of 2011 filed for a 
restraining order against her former husband, K.M.,43 K.M. filed a 
cross-complaint, seeking a restraining order against her. While Mr. 
K.M. retained counsel, Ms. D.N. did not. At the FRO hearing, the 
trial court urged Ms. D.N. to consider retaining counsel. Ms. D.N. 
explained that, while she would like to retain counsel, she could not 
                                                     
 41. The related Rutgers–Camden Pro Bono Domestic Violence Project 
trains interested law students to provide legal information—neither legal advice nor 
representation—to litigants who are in the restraining order process. Volunteer law 
students provide this information either over the phone or at the county courthouse. 
Volunteers also update literature produced by the Project, which are sent to police 
stations in the county and to wherever else they are requested.  
 42. N.J. CT. R. 1:21-3(b) (West 2015). 
 43. In the interest of confidentiality, New Jersey courts have ceased using 
party names and instead use initials or pseudonyms for parties in cases involving 
domestic violence. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-33(a); N.J. Ct. R. 1:38–3(a), (d). No 
record cites appear in this section because the record is sealed under the same statute 
and court rule.  
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afford to retain counsel because she was unemployed. Both parties 
alleged assault as the basis for the restraints. Ms. D.N. alleged that 
Mr. K.M., driving his truck, pursued her to a Walmart parking lot, 
veered towards her, and struck her with the truck’s side mirrors 
while she was standing on the truck’s running boards. Mr. K.M. 
conceded that he pursued Ms. D.N. to the Walmart parking lot, but 
denied striking Ms. D.N. with his truck and alleged that Ms. D.N. 
had slapped him earlier that day at the home the parties formerly 
shared.44 The record mentions at least two other TROs filed by Ms. 
D.N., which were dismissed by other judges, as well as two TROs 
filed by Mr. K.M. that were similarly dismissed. The judge hearing 
the matter on this particular occasion made note at the beginning of 
the hearing of the parties’ return to court.45 
From the early stages of the hearing, Ms. D.N. struggled with 
her responsibilities to represent herself pro se. When Mr. K.M.’s 
attorney attempted to admit police reports into evidence, Ms. D.N. 
attempted an untutored objection. When questioned on it by 
opposing counsel, she attempted to explain the objection but without 
a background was unable to articulate her reasoning until the judge 
eventually provided a prompt that objections are permitted when the 
document’s writer is not present in court.46 Ms. D.N. repeated these 
words back to the court, still not understanding the evidentiary 
requirements. The reports were then marked for identification, 
confusing Ms. D.N. Her attempts to object ultimately were fruitless. 
In a series of questions by his attorney, Mr. K.M. testified to the 
contents of the police reports, including the statements made by the 
police as well as the police officer’s thoughts—all of which were 
inadmissible hearsay.  
During the course of the hearing, the trial judge heard other 
inadmissible hearsay in the form of statements allegedly made by the 
parties’ minor daughter, court personnel, and Division of Youth and 
Family Services personnel.47 Mr. K.M.’s counseled testimony also 
contained improper speculation, leading questions, and most notably 
improper medical testimony about Ms. D.N.’s mental health. 
                                                     
 44. Brief of Amici Curiae, Domestic Violence Clinic, Rutgers School of 
Law et al., D.N. v. K.N., 83 A.3d 825 (N.J. 2014) (No. A-003021-11T3) (citing the 
transcript). More facts are included in the Appellate Division decision. D.N. v. 
K.M., 61 A.3d 150, 151-52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).  
 45. Brief, supra note 44, at 9.  
 46. Id. at 9-10.  
 47. Now renamed the Department of Children and Families. DEPARTMENT 
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, http://www.state.nj.us/dcf/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
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Specifically, Mr. K.M. testified to highly prejudicial statements in 
response to a leading question by his attorney that Ms. D.N. spent 
three weeks in a mental health hospital over a dozen years earlier, 
when the parties were first together. He also claimed, with no 
evidentiary support, that she had been diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder and exhibited “psychotic behavior,” for which she had taken 
a variety of medicines.48 No foundation of relevance was provided 
for this testimony. More importantly, Ms. D.N. lodged no objections 
to any of this improper testimony, allowing testimony to remain 
unchallenged on the record.49  
As a defendant to Mr. K.M.’s cross-complaint, Ms. D.N. 
conducted a similarly uninformed and ineffective cross-
examination.50 The trial judge corrected Ms. D.N. several times, as 
she repeatedly made arguments or issued statements rather than 
asked questions. The court neglected to allow Ms. D.N. an 
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. K.M. while she prosecuted her 
case against him on her own TRO. Instead, the trial judge moved 
directly into the ruling, without providing Ms. D.N. an opportunity to 
make a closing statement. Of course, attorneys are aware that their 
clients are permitted to cross-examine witnesses and give closing 
statements, and an attorney representing Ms. D.N. likely would have 
insisted on doing so.  
During her ruling, the trial judge failed to address undisputed 
testimony demonstrating that Mr. K.M. had pursued Ms. D.N. in his 
truck to the Walmart parking lot, where he confronted her. Instead, 
the trial judge ruled that Ms. D.N. had presented insufficient 
evidence of assault or injury to meet the burden of proof on her 
TRO. Accordingly, the trial judge dismissed Ms. D.N.’s TRO against 
Mr. K.M. At the same time, based on the evidence the trial judge 
heard, including the hearsay evidence, the trial judge granted Mr. 
K.M.’s FRO. The trial judge found that Ms. D.N. committed an act 
of harassment and that Mr. K.M. needed an FRO because of that act 
                                                     
 48. Brief, supra note 44, at 10. 
 49. Id. at 9-10.  
 50. Id. at 54. Very recently, a trial judge’s decision to grant a Final 
Restraining Order has been reversed for a failure to allow cross examination. C.H. v. 
J.S., No. A-5846-13T1, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 28, 2015), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a5876-13.pdf (concluding that the 
“defendant’s fundamental rights to be heard were trampled by the hearing 
procedures employed” when the defendant was not permitted to engage in cross-
examination and when the plaintiff’s case was based on text messages she neither 
described nor showed). 
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of harassment. The trial judge included in the FRO several of the 
twenty possible consequences to Ms. D.N., including a prohibition 
from any and all future contact with Mr. K.M., from owning or 
possessing any weapons, and from returning to the marital home or 
to Mr. K.M.’s place of work. The court gave Ms. D.N. a limit of 
twenty minutes to remove her boxed belongings from the marital 
home. She was ordered to pay a fine—although it was suspended 
because the trial judge’s uncertainty about Ms. D.N.’s ability to pay. 
Ms. D.N. was also told that she would be fingerprinted and 
photographed and that her name would be entered into a national 
registry.51  
Finally, based on Mr. K.M.’s improper testimony about Ms. 
D.N.’s mental health, the judge ordered Ms. D.N. to undergo a 
psychiatric evaluation. In all, the trial judge’s order resulted in Ms. 
D.N. facing at least nine different consequences resulting from the 
entry of the FRO against her. Mr. K.M. faced no consequences.  
B. The Appellate Division’s Affirmance  
An attorney represented Ms. D.N. on an appeal—whether on a 
pro bono basis we never knew—arguing first that Ms. D.N. proffered 
sufficient evidence to sustain her claim of assault, as well as her 
requisite need for the entry of an FRO.52 Counsel argued that the 
consequences of the entry of an FRO warrant the appointment of 
counsel when a party cannot afford to retain one. The Appellate 
Division specifically quoted that part of the trial court record in 
which the trial judge asked Ms. D.N. if she understood what the 
“consequences” would be if she were found guilty of an act of 
domestic violence.53  
The Appellate Division found no errors in the trial court’s 
considerations of the evidence. The Appellate Division rejected Ms. 
D.N.’s argument that the entry of the FRO results in consequences 
significant enough to warrant state-provided counsel for indigent 
parties in this type of civil action. The Appellate Division 
distinguished domestic violence restraining order hearings from 
other civil hearings—even other family court matters—in which 
New Jersey provides a civil counsel to indigent clients as cases in 
which the power of the state actor is pitted against an individual. In 
                                                     
 51. Brief, supra note 44, at 11.  
 52. D.N. v. K.M., 61 A.3d 151, 152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).  
 53. Id. at 154.  
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contrast, the Appellate Division reasoned that because the type of 
relief granted with an FRO is designed to prevent future harm to the 
plaintiff rather than punish a perpetrator or pit a powerful state actor 
against an individual, the special situations that would warrant a civil 
right to counsel are not warranted in domestic violence matters.54
Moreover, the Appellate Division, noting that the trial judge outlined 
to Ms. D.N. the possible consequences flowing from the entry of an 
FRO against her and offered her an adjournment to obtain counsel, 
concluded that Ms. D.N. understood what she was relinquishing 
when she moved forward with the hearing.55 Thus, Ms. D.N.’s
decision was deemed legally relevant despite her statements that she 
was unable to afford counsel. Never discussed were the relatively 
few pro bono options available to Ms. D.N.  
III. PERSUADING THE EXPERIENCED ADVOCATES WITH THE 
STUDENTS’ UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE
News of the Appellate Division decision was reported in the 
local legal newspaper,56 and while of interest to the two clinical 
professors, it was not something they saw as within their roles as 
clinical professors at that particular moment. They were soon 
persuaded otherwise by the three third-year law students. Those 
students did see it as a priority and saw the Rutgers Domestic 
Violence Clinic as the right organization to become involved.  
The issue of a right to court-appointed counsel made sense to 
these advanced clinic students. While they were completing longer-
term work from the prior semester and had a firmer footing because 
they were working on familiar projects, they nevertheless had fresh 
memories of their own steep learning curves in their previous clinic 
semester. They knew precisely how much work was involved with 
preparing a case for an FRO hearing because they had just finished 
being novices who had to go through the process. Moreover, the 
students comprehended the added complexities that attended a 
hearing involving cross-complaints in a way that they believed a pro 
se litigant would not.  
The D.N. case originated in the county next to ours,57 in the 
southern part of the state where there are relatively few organizations 
                                                     
54. Id. at 158. 
55. Id. at 159. 
56. Mary Pat Gallagher, Domestic Violence Litigants Have No Right to 
Counsel at State Expense, N.J. L.J., Jan. 24 2013, at 1, LEXIS.
57. D.N., 61 A.3d at 151. 
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that are equipped to handle appellate briefs in the area of domestic 
violence. The students thus felt some community responsibility and 
believed that if we did not become involved, then no other 
organization would. Soon, these three third-year law students had 
persuaded the professors and the deans that they should be permitted 
to approach the attorney representing Ms. D.N. in the petition for 
certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court and offer to work with 
him on the petition.  
Mr. Pettigrew, who ultimately became the student manager of 
the brief, took the initiative of contacting the attorney representing 
Ms. D.N.; simultaneously, we began speaking to the supervising 
attorney at the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, an 
organization also tracking the case.58 Initially the attorney who 
represented Ms. D.N. at the Appellate Division was interested in a 
partnership and provided copies of the transcript and lower court 
documents. Ultimately, after a few strategy discussions, he decided 
that he would file a very short petition in support of certification and 
possibly request leave for supplemental briefing after certification 
had been granted.59  
While the attorney’s approach is a common one, this did not 
work for the students or professors, either substantively or 
procedurally. The students’ thoughts about the arguments were 
operating on a different level, and their timing needs were 
fundamentally different by virtue of their own impending graduation 
and career trajectories. After graduation, Mr. Pettigrew, Mr. 
Gulbranson, and Mr. Natale were each moving to a federal or state 
appellate clerkship and knew that they would have to cease working 
on the case when they left the law school at graduation. That affected 
the timing of the filing, which in turn affected the procedural posture 
of what they could file. They were interested in devoting more 
intense time to the arguments up front, while they were still able to 
do so. In terms of the kairos, this two-or-three-month window of 
time was the right moment in their legal education to work on this 
type of project.  
Thus, what began as an idea to assist in writing the party brief 
became a project to write the brief as amici curiae in support of the 
grant of certification, filed by the clinic and the pro bono domestic 
violence program at Rutgers–Camden. We did not operate in 
                                                     
 58. John Pollock, Esq., Coordinator of the Public Justice Center’s National 
Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel Project.  
 59. This is permitted under N.J. CT. R. 2:12-11 (West 2015). 
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consultation with the attorney representing Ms. D.N., nor 
communicate except to forward copies of the amicus brief.60 The 
students had the clinicians to help guide them and serve as resources, 
but otherwise they were now in the role of activist attorneys 
developing arguments.  
At the time, the students were disappointed, thinking that this 
was almost a wasted effort—they believed that the certification was 
such a foregone conclusion that the amicus brief was superfluous. In 
retrospect, filing the brief that way was serendipitous. The court 
rules limit petition briefs to a maximum of twenty of New Jersey’s 
formatted pages in which to write an argument under any 
circumstances, which is equivalent to something around 6,000 
words.61 The petitioning brief was eleven pages and under 2,500 
words.62 In contrast, and based on Mr. Pettigrew’s research into non-
standard methods of filing amici curiae briefs, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court granted the students’ motion to file the brief at the 
full length normally allowed to parties in appellate matters.63 Given 
the outcome, the denial of certification, the amicus brief ended up 
offering the students the richest opportunity to make the strongest 
arguments. 
                                                     
 60. We did not see the party briefs until long after the New Jersey Supreme 
Court rendered its decision. However, neither did the National Coalition for a Civil 
Right to Counsel. E-mail from John Pollock, Coordinator, Nat’l Coal. for a Civil 
Right to Counsel, Staff Attorney, Pub. Justice Ctr. to Logan Elliott Pettigrew, 2013 
Graduate, Rutgers Sch. of Law–Camden (May 30, 2013, 2:38 PM) (copy on file 
with author). Because the attorney had told us the intended contents, we assumed 
this was simply an oversight that was caused by his busy practice and thought 
nothing of it at the time. Upon learning that the National Coalition for a Civil 
Counsel did not have the briefs, the attorney immediately forwarded them. E-mail 
from John Pollock, Coordinator, Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to Counsel, Staff 
Attorney, Pub. Justice Ctr. to Ruth Anne Robbins, Clinical Professor of Law, 
Rutgers Sch. of Law–Camden (Feb. 24, 2015, 5:10 PM) (copy on file with author).  
 61. New Jersey’s rules require attorneys to use Courier New, double-
spaced, with only twenty-six lines per page. N.J. CT. R. 2:6-10. This requirement 
extends to electronic filings as well, except that the rules are relaxed with respect to 
the size of top margins. Id.  
 62. Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff/Appellant, D.N., 61 A.3d 151 (No. A-
003021-11T3).  
 63. The filed brief was sixty-two pages in this formatting. Brief, supra note 
44. Excluding the tables of contents and authorities but including everything from 
the statement of interest to the signature lines and credits, the word count shows at 
13,053. Counsel has provided permission to the National Coalition for a Civil Right 
to Counsel to archive the briefs in the NCCRC’s state-by-state resources. State Map, 
NCCRC, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/map (last visited Dec. 10, 2015).  
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IV. THE RIGHT TOOLS: THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN NEW 
JERSEY IS BASED ON “CONSEQUENCES OF MAGNITUDE” 
At the heart of the arguments is the historical approach that the 
New Jersey legal system has taken when examining an indigent 
party’s civil right to counsel. Per the 1971 watershed case, decided 
only eight years after Gideon v. Wainwright,64 New Jersey already 
recognizes the right in a number of other legal scenarios. Guided by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s language, “[A]s a matter of simple 
justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction 
entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude 
without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel 
assigned without cost.”65  
That 1971 phrase has evolved into a legal standard unique to 
New Jersey and at the heart of the petition for certification. A court’s 
conclusion that a civil proceeding involves a potential “consequence 
of magnitude” will trigger a civil right to counsel for indigent clients 
because the court will have adjudged those instances to have adverse 
outcomes that “can be as devastating as those resulting from the 
conviction of a crime.”66 The “consequences of magnitude” language 
appears in municipal court rules and judicial opinions, creating a 
right for indigent parties to state-appointed counsel in a variety of 
civil matters where the courts have found that right as part of a fair 
trial and equal justice. To date those situations include: 
1. Any municipal matter that could result in incarceration;67  
2. Loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in 
municipal court in the aggregate of $800;68 
3. Child support enforcement proceedings;69  
4. Involuntary civil commitment proceedings;70  
5. Megan’s law tier classification hearings;71  
                                                     
 64. 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).  
 65. Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971) (emphasis 
added).  
 66. Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 671, 675 (N.J. 2006).  
 67. Guidelines for Determination of Consequences of Magnitude in 
Municipal Court, Second Appendix to Part VII to N.J. CT. R. 7:3-2(b) (2014), 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r7-2nd_appendix.htm. 
 68. Id. At the time of the amicus brief filing the amount was $750. 
 69. Pasqua, 892 A.2d at 671. 
 70. In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d 166, 167 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002).  
 71. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 372-73, 378 (N.J. 1995). Megan’s law 
refers to the laws requiring public law enforcement officials to make certain types 
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6. Loss of liberty such as the ability to own weapons or to 
move freely;72 
7. Criminal contempt for violations of FROs;73 and 
8. Proceedings regarding abuse, neglect, or termination of all 
parental rights.74  
The manner in which the students approached the synthesis of 
those circumstances formed the critical aspects of persuasion in the 
amicus brief.  
Prior to the D.N. case, the issue of court-appointed counsel for 
defendants had been raised in 2007 at the trial and appellate levels 
when a defendant filed a motion to dismiss an FRO, arguing the 
entire Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was unconstitutional on 
a variety of grounds.75 A family court judge agreed with certain 
points the defendant made; however, the judge nevertheless declined 
to find the Act unconstitutional based on a failure of provisions for 
the defendant’s right to state-appointed counsel.76 The New Jersey 
Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision to find the Act 
unconstitutional based on the burden of proof. In doing so, it noted 
that the issue of the right to counsel had yet to be resolved by the 
courts, but the record did not reflect that the defendant ever sought 
the appointment of counsel prior to or during the adjudication, 
making the point “purely academic.”77 The issue was not one of the 
six points addressed when the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed 
the Appellate Division’s decision and presumably was not included 
                                                                                                                
information about sexual crime offender registries available to the public. The 
amount of information available depends on the tier of offense.  
 72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 73. State v. Ashford, 864 A.2d 1122, 1125-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004).  
 74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43(a) (West 2015); N.J. Div. of Youth & 
Family Servs. v. B.R., 929 A.2d 1034, 1035, 1037 (N.J. 2007). 
 75. Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008) (reviewing the procedural history of the case prior to appeal), aff’d, 989 A.2d 
827 (N.J. 2010). 
 76. See Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1177. The trial judge found the Act 
unconstitutional for using a preponderance standard burden of evidence rather than a 
higher clear and convincing standard. The Appellate Division in Crespo noted that 
the issue had already been determined by another Appellate Division case, Roe v. 
Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), and took pains to quote Judge 
King’s opinion. As it happened, I was clerking for Judge King when the Roe 
decision was written and likely proofread the opinion as Judge King had his law 
clerks do.  
 77. Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1180. 
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in the petition for certification.78 It was therefore a novel issue when 
brought to the New Jersey Supreme Court in the petition for 
certification filed in 2013.  
V. THE GRAND STRATEGY: BOTH PARTIES SHOULD HAVE  
ACCESS TO COUNSEL  
From the beginning, the one concern that I and the other 
clinical professor raised was that of doing no harm to the majority of 
the clients of the clinic with the brief. The entire purpose of the New 
Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act is to provide victims of 
domestic violence with a method of accessing legal protections that 
does not require a criminal conviction or even, necessarily, criminal 
charges.79 The idea of civil protections is one of using the court 
system to intervene when a power imbalance in the parties’ 
relationship has resulted in one or more acts of violence.80 Any brief 
we filed from the Domestic Violence Clinic had to argue for a right 
to counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants. The Rutgers Domestic 
Violence Clinic represents victims of domestic violence—plaintiffs 
in these matters for the most part. Although it may be easier to 
understand why an indigent defendant should be entitled to a right to 
counsel, we could not take that position by itself. At the same time, 
we did not believe that we could make a persuasive argument about 
indigent plaintiffs having access to counsel without also 
acknowledging the defendants’ rights. One of the students’ 
challenges became conceptualizing arguments that allowed them to 
present arguments for indigent defendants’ civil right to counsel that 
would not appear to subtract from indigent plaintiffs’ equal right. 
The theme of making the two arguments work in tandem was 
“symmetry.”81  
At the time, only New York had a statute that provided a right 
to counsel for both parties in domestic violence proceedings.82 
Otherwise, by common law, one of only two published cases 
allowing the right in domestic violence restraining order hearings 
                                                     
 78. Id. at 828.  
 79. See § 2C:25-18. 
 80. See § 2C:25-19. The definitions do not discuss power imbalance 
explicitly, but the definitions of victim and acts of violence allow the inference.  
 81. Interview with Mark Gulbranson, Esq., 2013 Graduate, Rutgers Sch. of 
Law–Camden (Oct. 27, 2014). 
 82. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(ii) (West 2012) (referring to Article 8, 
Family Offense Proceedings); § 1120(a) (West 2010) (referring to right on appeals). 
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was a largely unnoticed trial level case, serendipitously, in New 
Jersey.83 The decision in that case turned on the plaintiff’s young age. 
Plaintiff, who was seventeen at the time of the hearing, alleged that 
the defendant punched and broke her car windshield while she was 
sitting in the driver’s seat. Plaintiff further alleged that this was not 
an isolated incident.84 The judge was troubled by the imbalanced 
courtroom scene in front of him and halted the proceedings, noting 
that there was  
no basis for this court to conclude that this minor plaintiff is in any way 
equipped to conduct this legal proceeding by herself, all alone against a 
represented adult. She has no legal experience with concepts such as direct 
and cross examination, introduction of evidence, or legal objections in a 
domestic violence case. She is a high school student and legally still a 
child, barely old enough to gain entry by herself into an R-rated movie 
fictionally depicting domestic violence.85 
Using law students as the actors, Mr. Natale organized a re-
enactment photograph of that imbalanced courtroom scene in the J.L. 
case, taken in the law school courtroom, and photographed as if the 
judge were the photographer, looking down from the bench. We kept 
the photograph propped up in my office during the drafting process 
to remind the trio about the policy reasons behind the arguments for 
indigent plaintiffs, as well as defendants, requiring access to counsel 
during domestic violence restraining order hearings.  
After that, the decision became the ordering of the arguments 
and the use of the persuasive techniques that the students had learned 
and utilized many times in their other clinic cases and in their legal 
writing work.  
A. The Presentation of Arguments (and an Explanation of Why) 
The legal argument was broken into four major parts, with a 
fifth serving as a conclusion. It is easiest to show the argument 
structure and rhetorical strategy side-by-side, in chart form.  
                                                     
 83. See J.L. v. G.D., 29 A.3d 752 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (holding 
that a minor plaintiff in a domestic violence restraining order hearing is entitled to 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to provide her with an adult voice, and in this 
case the plaintiff was entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent her interests 
during the hearing). In the other published case, the Ohio Court of Appeals found a 
due process right for juvenile respondents to have appointed counsel in civil 
protection order proceedings. In re D.L., 937 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2010). 
 84. See J.L., 29 A.3d at 754. 
 85. Id. at 756. 
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Argument Rhetorical strategy 
POINT I. The twenty 
different consequences an 
FRO may entail render 
domestic violence 
proceedings categorically 
different from proceedings 
previously addressed 
under New Jersey’s civil 
right to counsel principles 
The argument began with what Kathy 
Stanchi has called a “Foot-in-door” 
technique. That is a way to organize the 
arguments by leading with premise or 
statement with which the audience is 
likely to agree, and then chaining other 
requests from that point.86 It is easier to 
see how defendants are aggrieved by a 
lack of access to counsel, and therefore 
the brief began with this position. Making 
this decision to lead with an argument for 
the defendant was careful and 
deliberate—the Domestic Violence Clinic 
represents victims. The students and 
professors determined that the most 
credible way to argue for victims was to 
begin with the defendants’ rights. 
A. The body of law in New 
Jersey broadly 
conceives the civil right 
to counsel  
 
This section suggests logical consistency 
across New Jersey law. To show the 
current inconsistency, the section contains 
a comparison of the same act by the 
defendant in two parallel court hearings 
as a way to demonstrate the current 
inconsistencies and unfairness to indigent 
litigants facing charges stemming from 
the same incident. If a person is charged 
with the crime of harassment, a petty 
disorderly offense, the matter would be 
heard in municipal court, and an indigent 
defendant would be entitled to a court-
appointed counsel because of the fines 
and remote possibility of incarceration (if 
a repeat offender, for example).  
The very same acts of harassment, 
however, if used by the victim for the 
purposes of seeking a restraining order, 
could result in twenty different 
                                                     
 86. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 418-19. 
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consequences for the defendant. Those 
range from loss of ability to access the 
home, to loss of the right to own or carry 
a weapon, to mandatory drug testing and 
psychological counseling. But the law 
would permit no right to court-appointed 
counsel to the indigent defendant.  
Mr. Pettigrew presented the comparison 
in chart form as a visual persuasion tool 
for the reader.87  
B. Domestic violence 
proceedings give rise to 
myriad consequences in 
excess of the 
“consequences of 
magnitude” already 
recognized by this 
Court’s right to counsel 
jurisprudence 
In addition to setting out the general 
principles of the “consequences of 
magnitude” law, this section spent time 
noting that the municipal court rule 
codifying the standard was a key and 
memorable analogy to domestic violence 
restraining order hearings. 
The analogy was designed to activate 
visualizations of municipal court 
hearings, which are also summary 
proceedings, with a long docket sheet of 
matters listed for hearing on the same day 
or evening. This is similar to the scene in 
a family courtroom on a day of domestic 
violence restraining order hearings. 
Persuasion is more effective when 
visualization is possible. 
1. Domestic violence 
orders result in a 
substantial loss of 
essential 
privileges 
 
These subsections used analogical 
reasoning to compare the loss of a 
driver’s license and the potential impact 
on employment to the loss of a 
professional license that the entry of a 
domestic violence restraining order has 
                                                     
 87. For more on visual organizers used for legal analysis, see Steve 
Johansen & Ruth Anne Robbins, Art-iculating the Analysis: Systemizing the 
Decision to Use Visuals as Legal Reasoning, 20 LEGAL WRITING 57, 83-86 (2015) 
(including a discussion of the chart).  
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2. Domestic violence 
orders carry 
significant 
monetary 
sanctions 
on an aggressor who is in certain types of 
licensed professions.  
Similarly, the entry of an FRO carries 
with it financial penalties in the form of 
two separate fines. Also assessed will be 
living expenses including child support, 
temporary spousal support as appropriate, 
and payment for two housing costs 
because the defendant cannot live in the 
same home as the victim.  
C. Even if domestic 
violence proceedings do 
not give rise to 
consequences of 
magnitude, such 
actions impact 
fundamental interests  
This section reviewed the other situations 
in which New Jersey has recognized a 
civil right to counsel for indigent parties. 
The students grouped those situations 
according to the types of fundamental 
rights they touched upon: reputation, 
liberty, and parental/property rights 
1. Domestic violence 
actions engender 
social 
consequences and 
stigma  
The social stigma of being labeled a 
domestic violence batterer relates to the 
stigma of being adjudged a Megan’s Law 
violator or to being involuntarily 
committed.  
2. FROs result in a 
loss of liberty for 
the defendant  
In this section, the Constitutional right to 
bear arms is discussed as are the 
consequences of domestic violence 
restraining orders that impact the 
defendant’s speech (limitations on 
contacting certain persons) and on the 
defendant’s movements (restrictions on 
the defendant’s right to travel to certain 
locations such as where the plaintiff 
resides or works).  
3. FROs impact 
fundamental 
parental and 
property rights 
that already carry 
a civil right to 
counsel  
The argument in this section tied the 
custody changes caused by the entry of an 
FRO to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
language that the right to raise one’s child 
is more precious than property rights—
language that created a right to counsel in 
parental termination cases. The entry of a 
restraining order normally involves 
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material changes to custody following an 
initial period of disruption between the 
entry of the temporary and the conclusion 
of the final hearing and any required 
evaluations.  
POINT II. The right to 
court-appointed counsel in 
domestic violence 
proceedings must flow to 
both parties 
Point I was relatively straightforward and 
flowed from the appellate decision. It is 
relatively easy for readers to understand 
why a defendant might need a civil right 
to counsel in a domestic violence hearing. 
Point II’s purpose was to connect the 
arguments to a civil right to counsel for 
plaintiffs as well as defendants. The 
theme in Part II was “symmetry,” and 
everything that Mr. Gulbranson wrote 
was designed to create a symmetrical 
argument with Mr. Pettigrew’s arguments 
in Point I.  
The argument began with the purpose of 
the Act itself: to provide a broad form of 
protective relief to victims. A crucial 
argument for the plaintiff appears up 
front: In other right-to-counsel situations, 
the plaintiff is already represented by the 
State and does not need to request 
counsel. Domestic violence restraining 
order hearings are different and require 
both parties to be granted the right.  
A. Granting counsel to 
both parties in 
domestic violence 
proceedings fits within 
the protective 
framework established 
by the New Jersey 
Legislature and its 
Courts 
The New Jersey Supreme Court and the 
Attorney General has promulgated an 
extensive (294-page) Domestic Violence 
Procedure Manual as a guide for judicial 
and law enforcement personnel.88 
Significantly, the manual outlines 
instructions for procedures involved with 
a two-tiered system based on a party’s 
ability to retain an attorney. That 
procedure of “civil restraints” permits a 
                                                     
 88. SUPREME COURT OF N.J. & THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.J., 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEDURES MANUAL (2008), https://www.judiciary.state.nj. 
us/family/dvprcman.pdf.  
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represented party to negotiate a settlement
despite a statutory prohibition on 
negotiations.89
B. One New Jersey court 
has already found that 
parties in a domestic 
violence proceeding 
must be on equal 
footing
The J.L. case was discussed with details 
selected to create the third visual impact 
moment in the legal argument.90 The 
message is, “It would run contrary to 
common sense principles as well as 
equity to allow the courthouse mechanism 
of protection to re-victimize the victim.”
The case was not used as one of 
analogical reasoning but as policy-based 
reasoning. The same policies that led the 
trial judge to rule as he did in the J.L.
case are pertinent to all domestic violence 
                                                     
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2015) provides, “[t]he issue of 
whether or not a violation of this act occurred, including an act of contempt under 
this act, shall not be subject to mediation or negotiation in any form.” This 
opportunity to enter into a consent stay-away order called “civil restraints” and is 
available to those parties who have children in common or who are going through 
divorce and who are represented by counsel. The trial courts will facilitate that 
process on a non-domestic violence docket number. These civil restraints do not 
involve the same criminal contempt protections as domestic violence restraining 
orders, but they do allow the plaintiff to return to court for enforcement under the 
normal family court negotiated agreement enforcement procedures. Entry of civil 
restraints avoids the consequences to the defendants related to the twenty types of 
permanent relief—there is no mandatory forfeiture of weapons or inclusion on the 
Domestic Violence Registry. Entry of civil restraints also avoids the potential 
trauma associated with a plaintiff testifying or with failing to meet a burden of proof 
and leaving the courthouse with no protections at all. The trial court may not 
facilitate the entry of civil restraints on its own initiative or suggestion, which means 
that either the parties must be aware of the possibility, or—as is most usually the 
case—at least one party is represented and suggests it as an alternative. In other 
words, cases with legally trained parties have more opportunities for resolution.  
90. J.L. v. G.D., 29 A.3d 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010), discussed at
note 83 and related text. For readings on visual impact moments, see Jason Parry 
Eyster, Lawyer as Artist: Using Significant Moments and Obtuse Objects to 
Enhance Advocacy, 14 LEGAL WRITING 87 (2008). Professor Eyster muses that it 
may be significant for lawyers that “static images are rated as significantly more 
vivid than active images.” Id. at 91 n.12 (citing David Pearson, Rossana De Beni & 
Cesare Cornoldi, The Generation, Maintenance, and Transformation of the Visuo-
Spatial Mental Images, in IMAGERY, LANGUAGE, AND VISUO-SPATIAL THINKING 1, 
10 (Michel Denis et al. eds., 2001)). For usage in legal writing, see RUTH ANNE 
ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN, & KEN CHESTEK, YOUR CLIENT’S STORY: PERSUASIVE 
LEGAL WRITING 242-45 (2013). 
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hearings. The re-enactment photograph 
was the inspiration for this section.  
C. Victims of domestic 
violence, in seeking the 
court’s protection, face 
significant 
consequences of 
magnitude 
In this section, Mr. Gulbranson wove in 
non-adjudicative and non-legal research 
discussing the social science research of 
reclaiming one’s autonomy. The hearing 
itself is consequential because it is likely 
the first time the victim has seen the 
aggressor since the precipitating actions 
that led to the TRO filing and because the 
victim has to testify to facts that are, by 
their nature, demoralizing and 
humiliating. The consequences to the 
victim of the entry or denial of an FRO 
are significant because they affect 
custody, finances, living situations, 
safety, and relationships.  
Many law students would have had a hard 
time trying to discern an “IRAC” 
structure in this section. There wasn’t 
one.  
POINT III. Both parties in 
domestic violence 
proceedings face the risk 
of egregious trial errors 
Finally, the facts of the case were used in 
this section as a demonstrative illustration 
of the vulnerabilities of unrepresented 
parties who do not understand the 
consequences of moving forward without 
counsel and who cannot afford to retain 
counsel even when the consequences are 
explained to them.  
This was the first time that the facts of 
this particular case came back into the 
arguments. The facts were used to argue 
for granting certification of this case, 
rather than a future case. This case 
already presented the type of situation 
that highlights what can—and did—go 
wrong, procedurally, when a party 
requested counsel, but none was 
provided. This case was complex because 
the parties filed cross-complaints against 
each other. That the plaintiff filed two 
A. The court admitted 
numerous hearsay 
statements into 
evidence and 
overlooked egregiously 
leading questioning 
B. Ms. D.N.’s lack of legal 
expertise meant that 
she was unable to 
effectively cross-
examine 
C. The litany of 
preventable errors is a 
poignant example of 
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the need for counsel in 
domestic violence cases 
briefs as part of the primary certification 
package underscores the complexity.  
Because law students are more frequently 
asked to engage with facts for the 
purposes of analogical reasoning, i.e., 
fact-to-fact comparisons with prior case 
law, the use of the litigation-story facts in 
this alternative manner was not intuitive. 
Mr. Natale learned something about civil 
rights advocacy from writing this section 
and remembers this as a very interesting 
lesson. It was a very interesting teaching 
point, but also a more difficult one than 
the professors appreciated at the time. 
Point IV. Providing 
counsel to domestic 
violence litigants is 
economically and 
practically feasible 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted 
that practical considerations are 
relevant,91 and we knew the Court would 
be concerned about the feasibility of 
creating a right when there are between 
14,000 and 15,000 cases heard each year.  
The argument here was attempting to 
show that solutions are attainable through 
the statutory scheme of a domestic 
violence surcharge that could be used for 
funding.92 The persuasive technique here 
was one of framing: We urged the court 
to frame the numbers county-by-county 
rather than statewide. Statistical data are 
kept on a countywide basis. The two 
counties with the largest caseloads also 
have multiple agencies, including the 
three law schools in the state.  
B. The Students’ Reflections on the Process  
None of these students remembers this brief as a simple one. 
Brief writing in the abstract was not an issue for these students: Mr. 
                                                     
 91. See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 220 (N.J. 1971).  
 92. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.4 (authorizing a surcharge, proceeds to be 
used for program funding). 
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Pettigrew had dashed off a short motion brief during the fall semester 
Domestic Violence Clinic and received enough praise from a trial 
judge for other clinic students to try to mimic it. But, in discussions 
afterwards, the students noted that it is “remarkably different” in 
several respects to write a brief as amici curiae because their 
lawyering education to that point had focused on legal analysis in the 
context of client representation.  
Mr. Natale, the student who was the most committed to civil 
rights issues, found that he particularly struggled with the format of 
the brief because, as he said afterwards, he kept “losing his place in 
the case” and trying to determine what his role was with his section 
of the argument.93 It took him time to come to terms with the fact that 
his task was to focus on the small generic issues that happened at 
trial and to present them in the aggregate as representative of the 
problem with this group of litigants having no access to a right to 
counsel.94 Initially he put a great deal of pressure on himself to win 
the case for Ms. D.N. based on her story. He kept forgetting, he 
reflected afterwards, that it was not his job to tell Ms. D.N.’s story 
for the merits—that was the role of her actual attorney. After the 
fact, Mr. Natale has spent the most time continuing to think about the 
issues and about what else could be done to build towards response-
changing in this area of law.95 In contrast, Mr. Gulbranson reported 
that when he agreed to write the section of the brief arguing the 
victim’s right to counsel, he did not fully appreciate the complexity 
of the arguments until he was mired in the material. He also found it 
difficult to maintain perspective while “inside the arguments” but 
used the symmetry theme as his way of staying grounded. As an 
aside, Mr. Gulbranson told me that until this brief he had not fully 
                                                     
 93. Interview with Mark Natale, Esq., 2013 Graduate, Rutgers Sch. of 
Law–Camden (Oct. 27, 2014).  
 94. Id. Mr. Natale talked about books he read that taught him the same 
lessons including, naturally, ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Vintage Books 
1989) (1964) (telling the story behind the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright). 
The two other books were GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD 
MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2013) and 
RAWN JAMES JR., ROOT AND BRANCH: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON, THURGOOD 
MARSHALL, AND THE STRUGGLE TO END SEGREGATION (2010).  
 95. Persuasion is an attempt by a speaker to elicit a response in the 
audience. To simplify, there are three types of possible responses: creation (when 
the audience has no prior knowledge), reinforcement of an existing behavior or 
belief, or change to a behavior or attitude. The last is the most difficult response to 
achieve. Gerald R. Miller, On Being Persuaded, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-16 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau 
eds., 2002).  
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appreciated the importance of Brandeis Briefing. Although he had 
used the technique in other brief writing situations, he had done so 
because he felt it was expected rather than because it felt right.96 
The style of the writing also took the students outside of their 
comfort zones. Mr. Pettigrew brought up this point early in the 
process—for this brief he felt his tone shift away from a large law 
firm perspective and into that of a public interest attorney.97 He also 
continued to question the use of a chart in the very early pages of the 
argument section he worked on—a chart that we debated for some 
time during the drafting stages. As of a year after filing the brief, he 
was still unsure whether he would have included it, if left to his own 
devices.98 Mr. Gulbranson’s writing was already very good, but he 
turned a corner during this brief. His writing became more like that 
of a seasoned appellate attorney. There was a narrative flow not 
often seen in law student writing. Most of the brief is like that, in 
fact—there is very little of the student left in the writing style.99  
VI. KAIROS PASSED BY . . . THE DECISION  
The New Jersey Supreme Court informed us eight months later 
that it had denied certification. By that time, in January 2014, the 
students were already sworn in as members of the bar and were deep 
into their clerkships. Nevertheless, all three paused their day to react 
immediately, with surprise and dejection. Any wonders why were 
answered immediately in the wonderment of the published decision 
along with the published dissent. It took a day for the import of 
having a published opinion and dissent to sink in.100 
                                                     
 96. Interview with Mark Gulbranson, supra note 81.  
 97. That is, he had to shift his normal writing tone as part of responding to 
the rhetorical situation. The students were exposed to Lloyd Bitzer’s idea of the 
rhetorical situation as applied in lawyering during the revamped moot court course. 
See Jason K. Cohen, Attorneys at the Podium: A Plain-Language Approach to Using 
the Rhetorical Situation in Public Speaking Outside the Courtroom, 8 LEGAL COMM. 
& RHETORIC: JALWD 73, 75-84 (2011), relying on the work of Lloyd F. Bitzer, The 
Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 6 (1968). 
 98. E-mail from Logan Elliott Pettigrew, Esq., 2013 Graduate, Rutgers Sch. 
of Law–Camden to Ruth Anne Robbins, Clinical Professor of Law–Camden 
(deleted from files) (June 2014) (sent in response to question for presentation 
preparation for Legal Writing Institute Biennial Conference, Phila., PA, July 2014).  
 99. Five semesters of legal writing for two of the students and six semesters 
for the other. Mr. Natale still likes to harangue me for not teaching him all six.  
 100. D.N. v. K.M., 83 A.3d 825, 825-26 (N.J. 2014). 
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The per curiam opinion focused on pragmatic concerns it 
associated with permitting the parties a right to seek counsel 
provided by the State. For the 2012–2013 court year, the court noted 
that there were 15,800 FRO hearings, and the opinion noted that the 
Administrative Office of the Courts maintains records that the vast 
majority of both plaintiffs and defendants are unrepresented.101 New 
Jersey operates a system of pro bono assignment of private counsel 
for indigent defendants, but assigns only 1,200 cases per year.102 The 
opinion concluded with the statement that this case did not appear to 
be the right vehicle because Ms. D.N. did not assert that she was 
indigent nor ask the trial court to appoint counsel.  
It is in Justice Barry T. Albin’s published dissent, however, that 
the students found some gratification. As mentioned, Justice Albin’s 
dissent is longer than the per curiam decision. In it he listed the 
consequences that a defendant faces, any of which would create a 
right to the appointment of counsel by themselves: the loss of 
custody and possession of a home; large fines; the placement of her 
name on a registry, which in turn could jeopardize her ability to 
maintain or secure employment or credit; and the right to possess a 
firearm. Moreover, Justice Albin found it unreasonable to expect an 
uncounseled and untutored person to know how to assert her right to 
request counsel.103 He thought that the D.N. case was appropriate for 
certification of this issue.  
His dissent then reviewed the history of the civil right to 
counsel in New Jersey as it relates to the right to a fair trial, chiding 
“those who expect this Court to remain at the forefront of ensuring a 
fair adversarial process for the poor who face serious consequences 
of magnitude in civil cases.”104  
                                                     
 101. Id. at 825-26. It is cheering to notice that the opinion mentioned both 
plaintiffs and defendants—that is, the majority of justices appeared to be 
entertaining the issue as one of a right attaching to both parties at the hearing.  
 102. Id. at 826 (upholding the constitutionality of the system) (citing Madden 
v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211 (N.J. 1992)). 
 103. In fact, Ms. D.N. told the judge that she could not afford counsel, 
although she did not technically claim to be indigent.  
 104. D.N., 83 A.3d at 827 (Albin, J., dissenting). Comparable to the famous 
Gideon v. Wainwright decision in the United States Supreme Court, New Jersey’s 
germinal case articulating the right to counsel in state criminal cases is Rodriguez v. 
Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216 (1971). Justice Albin referenced both cases while writing 
to his colleagues, “Had the United States Supreme Court taken the cost-analysis 
approach, Gideon would not be on the books today, nor would Rodriguez.” D.N., 83 
A.3d at 828. 
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In his last major point, Justice Albin listed the many 
consequences that flow from the entry of an FRO and asked a 
rhetorical question, the language of which is telling. “How can our 
jurisprudence reconcile the right of appointed counsel to a defendant 
facing a $750 fine or a one-day license suspension in municipal court 
with the denial of that right to a defendant who is facing much more 
serious consequences in Superior Court in a domestic violence 
cases?”105 In that question, the students could see the effect of their 
persuasion. Justice Albin found persuasive the comparisons of 
summary proceedings in municipal courts and domestic violence 
courts. He was also persuaded by the comparison between a 
relatively minor matter handled in municipal court to the bullet-point 
list of twenty consequences flowing from FROs, although he might 
have preferred driving license suspensions to have appeared on the 
chart instead of harassment.106  
The language of the published denial of certification, taken 
with the dissent, holds open the door for another opportunity. In re-
reading the briefs, the arguments still ring true. It was not the 
arguments, it was not the writers, and it probably wasn’t the parties. 
It must have been the wrong moment in time.  
A. The Wrong Moment in Time for New Jersey  
Given the political milieu of the 2012–2013 court term and the 
logistical difficulties that a ruling allowing a right to counsel for 
31,000 litigants annually might entail, it seems obvious in retrospect 
that the timing was not right for the New Jersey Supreme Court to 
take up the issue. We knew, going in, that there would be difficulties 
and challenges to the court accepting the arguments, but we were 
naïve, perhaps, in assuming that the case would be decided on its 
merits. In retrospect, the decision the New Jersey Supreme Court 
made to decline certification was the second best for which we could 
have hoped. The published decision and dissent are priceless tools 
allowing advocates to consider carefully the best way to tailor future 
advocacy.  
At the time of the briefing, the state of New Jersey was facing 
serious financial woes—as were many states.107 At the same time, the 
                                                     
 105. Id.  
 106. The driving license suspension comparison came up three times in the 
brief—it was argued.  
 107. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PUB. FIN. OF THE STATE OF N.J., STATE OF NEW 
JERSEY DEBT REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 67 (2014), http://www.yourmoney.nj. 
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New Jersey Supreme Court was still the unwilling participant of 
what one legal scholar has analogized to a three-ring circus108 
involving all three branches of government and lasting several years, 
beginning in 2010. The origin of the struggle with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court did not originate in one specific court action, 
although certain hot-button items exacerbated the tensions. Governor 
Christie has publicly criticized justices for what he sees as judicial 
activism particularly on issues involving state funding for public 
issues relating to some of the citizens with the least ability to speak 
for themselves. For example, he openly criticized Justice Albin in 
2011 on the issue of school funding in poorer school districts,109 and 
he criticized Chief Justice Rabner in July 2013 about the Court’s 
decision on the issue of affordable housing.110 Lambda Legal pointed 
to the same public justice hot-button items in a 2014 video 
                                                                                                                
gov/transparency/debt/pdf/2013_Debt_Report.pdf (listing New Jersey as the state 
with the fourth highest debt per capita rating).  
 108. Roslyn F. Martorano, The Three-Ring Circus: New Jersey’s 2010 
Judicial Retention Crisis, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1837, 1837 (2011–12); Richard Pérez-
Peña, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice from Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
2010, at A22.  
 109. For example, at town hall meetings several weeks before the decision 
was released, Governor Christie publicly disparaged Justice Albin making remarks 
during the hearings that pertained to taxation decisions made during the Christie 
Administration—comments that led editors of one New Jersey newspaper to publish 
an editorial calling attention to the vitriol. See, e.g., Editorial, The Attack on Justice 
Barry Albin, STAR-LEDGER (Apr. 28, 2011, 5:30 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_ 
editorial_page/2011/04/the_attack_on_justice_barry_al.html (criticizing Governor 
Christie for attacking Justice Albin, calling it a “new low,” “tasteless,” and a “cheap 
and dishonest attempt to demonize Albin by distorting his statements [about] school 
funding”). Justice Albin was not the author of a school funding decision in 2011 that 
ordered the state to spend $500 million more than had been budgeted on public 
education in the identified poorer school districts. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 
A.3d 1018, 1023 (N.J. 2011). Justice Jaynee LaVecchia authored the opinion. 
Justice Albin filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1100 (Albin, J., concurring). 
 110. Martin Bricketto, NJ Court Checks Gov. Powers with Affordable 
Housing Ruling, LAW360 (July 10, 2013, 7:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/456110/nj-court-checks-gov-powers-with-affordable-housing-ruling. 
Governor Christie attempted to abolish the state’s Commission on Affordable 
Housing (COAH). Instead, the Court ruled that the Governor could not do so 
without following a particular set of procedures, based on certain reorganization 
structures in the state that also govern Rutgers University and that prevented the 
Legislature from severing Rutgers–Camden from the university. Governor Christie’s 
comments about Chief Justice Rabner on the decision were termed “blistering” by 
the reporter. Id. To put this in temporal context, this statement by Governor Christie 
was made approximately two months after the briefs were submitted in support of 
certification in the D.N. case.  
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discussing judicial independence issues in New Jersey.111 To grant 
certification on this civil right to counsel case could very easily have 
opened a new chapter of bitter words directed at another group of 
underrepresented litigants in the state. While it does not lessen the 
students’, nor this professor’s continuing belief in the merits of the 
issue, it redirects some energies towards contemplating what an 
infrastructure might look like that could support a legal decision in 
favor of a civil right to counsel. 
B. The Thread, Pulled  
The resolution of the D.N. petition for certification captured the 
attention of the editorial board of the New Jersey Law Journal as the 
direct result of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s published denial and 
dissent of certification.112 The case has also been the subject of an 
opinion/editorial piece designed, also, to raise awareness.113 John 
Pollock, the staff attorney at the Public Justice Center and the 
Coordinator attorney at the National Coalition for a Civil Right to 
Counsel has said that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denial of 
certification was his biggest blow of 2014. I have encouraged him to 
see it not as a loss, but as a first step.  
                                                     
 111. Lambda Legal, Bullying the Bench: Gov. Christie’s Attack on New 
Jersey’s Court (May 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Cfi7JAf9nM. 
Lambda Legal was not lobbying for gay marriage when it made the video (gay 
marriage was already legal in New Jersey at the time), but was lobbying for the 
reappointment of Chief Justice Rabner, whose reappointment was in doubt not on 
the merits but for political concerns. Lambda Legal’s concerns for Chief Justice 
Rabner stemmed from comments made by Governor Christie during the gay 
marriage case, who was open with his plans to “reshape the court,” based on his 
belief that it “has repeatedly strayed from its purview and overstepped its role.” 
Editorial, Obvious Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/08/15/opinion/obvious-inequality.html?ref=opinion&_r=2&. Previously, 
Governor Christie had declined to reappoint two other justices: the first governor to 
decline to do so since New Jersey’s 1947 Constitution. The video builds a theme 
that the success of civil rights in New Jersey turns on the independence of the 
judiciary. The history of judicial reappointments in New Jersey is part of the same 
history of the judicial crisis of 2010–2014 and has been the subject of several law 
review and mainstream press articles as well as a Rachel Maddow segment on 
MSNBC, but is outside the scope of this Article.  
 112. Editorial, Domestic Violence Counsel, N.J. L.J., Jan. 17, 2014), at 1, 
LEXIS.  
 113. John Pollock, Parties in Domestic Violence Matters Should Have a 
Right to Counsel, N.J. L.J. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/ 
uploaded_files/181/Parties_in_Domestic_Violence_Matters_Should_Have_a_Right
_to_Counsel__Pollock_-_NJLJ_.pdf.  
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Linda Berger suggests that some dissents operate as her 
proverbial pulled threads in the social fabric of the sky that may be 
tugged at an opportune moment when it appears in a different 
chronological time.114 What is a dissent in one case may become the 
basis for a majority decision in the next.115 Justice Albin himself has 
assured other Rutgers Law students at their 2015 graduation 
ceremonies that a dissent may lay a claim on the future.116 In the D.N.
decision, the majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly held 
open the door for the possibility of revisiting the issue with another 
case on another day. 
Some of the language used by courts in later decisions since 
January 2014—when the New Jersey Supreme Court filed its 
opinion—suggests that there may be a slight shift in view. Since 
January 2014, the Appellate Division’s ruling in D.N. has been cited 
three times when parties represented themselves pro se at the FRO 
hearing after requesting and being denied an adjournment or second 
adjournment to seek legal counsel.117 In each case, the Appellate 
Division cited the same language from D.N. calling attention to the 
importance of legal representation at FRO hearings, “[d]ue process 
. . . does allow litigants a meaningful opportunity to defend against a 
complaint in domestic violence matters, which would include the 
opportunity to seek legal representation, if requested.”118
Certainly, in those cases, the courts presumed the party’s
ability to afford that representation when speaking of due process 
rights. But, one panel of appellate judges remanded the entry of an 
FRO for a new trial, indicating its unease with the decision of the 
trial court to move forward with a hearing when it was clear that the 
defendant understood neither the mechanics of the trial process nor 
                                                     
114. Berger, supra note 13, at 19, 28-29. She referred to it as the “fabric of 
the social sky” at the Applied Legal Storytelling Conference. 
115. Id. at 21 (discussing the way Justice Holmes characterized a dissent in a 
whole new light to use it as a springboard for a majority decision).  
116. Barry T. Albin, J., Supreme Court of N.J., Address at Rutgers Univ. –
Newark Law Sch. Commencement (May 22, 2015), https://www.newark.rutgers. 
edu/justice-barry-t-albins-address-students.  
117. See A.M. v. M.M., 2014 WL 2681274, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2014); M.A.T. v. V.A.M., 2014 WL 1909553, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2014); L.F. v. A.S., 2014 WL 1660468, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014); V.D. 
v. K.O., 2014 WL 982531, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (citing D.N., 61 
A.3d at 159); S.C. v. A.M., No. A-1870-12T4, 2014 WL 243093, at *5 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
118. See A.M., 2014 WL 2681274, at *1 (citing D.N. v. K.M, 61 A.3d 150, 
159 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012)); V.D., 2014 WL 982531, at *4 (quoting D.N.,
63 A.2d at 159); S.C., 2014 WL 243093, at *5 (quoting D.N., 61 A.3d at 159).  
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the consequences of not understanding the mechanics. The defendant 
in that case did not express a wish to retain counsel but rather 
indicated a willingness to listen to the plaintiff’s testimony and “take 
it from that point,” although the defendant also told the judge during 
a colloquy, “I really don’t know what’s going on.”119 The court was 
quick to point out that this alone might not have resulted in plain 
error, but that a subsequent turn of events during the trial implicated 
additional due process rights, requiring a reversal. Analogous to the 
mental health and hearsay evidence permitted at trial in the D.N. 
case, the plaintiff in the S.C. case testified to expanded allegations 
beyond the scope of the TRO, which the trial judge permitted and 
relied upon when granting the FRO, in violation of the defendant’s 
due process rights.120 These are precisely the types of trial errors that 
suggest the need for a right to counsel to ensure the party’s right to a 
fair trial.  
New Jersey may not have had its opportune moment, but the 
moment is beginning to happen in twenty-eight other states plus the 
District of Columbia.121 The most advancement has happened in 
states nearby. Maryland is on track to become the second state in the 
country to have a right to counsel in civil domestic violence cases. A 
Legislative Task Force released a report in October 2014 
recommending a right to counsel in civil domestic violence cases.122 
New York already granted that right by statute, but has since gone 
further. In mid-June 2015, both houses of the New York Legislature 
adopted a concurrent resolution supporting a statewide policy of 
“legal assistance for persons in need of the essentials of life.”123 The 
resolution is not binding, but idealized and was moved to the top of 
                                                     
 119. Id. at *6. 
 120. S.C. v. A.M., 2014 WL 243093, at *6 (citing J.D. v. M.D.F., 25 A.3d 
1045, 1057 (N.J. 2011)); H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 412-13 (N.J. 2003). 
 121. See ABA RESOURCE CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE INITIATIVES, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STATE ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSIONS: CREATION, 
COMPOSITION, AND FURTHER DETAILS, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_atj_commissions_table.
authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Sept. 2014).  
 122. ROBERT R. NEALL, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY 
IMPLEMENTING A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MARYLAND 20-22 (2014), 
http://www.mdcourts.gov/mdatjc/taskforcecivilcounsel/pdfs/finalreport201410.pdf. 
The Maryland Commission on Child Custody Decision-Making has also endorsed 
the right to counsel in domestic violence cases. Id. at 9-10. 
 123. CON. RES. C776/B2995 (N.Y. 2015); see also Joel Stashenko, 
Legislature’s Resolution Supports Civil Gideon, N.Y. L.J. (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202730718872/Legislatures-Resolution-
Supports-Civil-Gideon.  
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New York’s Office of Court Administration priority list this year.124 
New York claims it leads the nation with the resolution and defines 
“essentials of life” very broadly, but the standard’s wording sounds 
familiar, an echo of New Jersey’s “consequences of magnitude” 
language. The Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court has 
also announced that the state is exploring the issue of providing 
counsel in all civil matters, calling it “particularly important when 
such issues as housing, family matters, access to health care, 
education and subsistence income are being decided.”125 
The students have accomplished something already by putting 
on New Jersey advocates’ radar the problematic procedures in play 
when either party cannot afford to retain counsel for an FRO hearing. 
Any change to the law that could implicate legal services on a large 
scale will realistically take time and additional advocacy.126 And, in 
reality, the issue was not waving brightly in New Jersey for any 
advocate to see as a priority problem before the students asked the 
Rutgers Domestic Violence Clinic to participate in the D.N. case. 
Advocates are now forced to address it, and at least a handful see it 
as a priority topic. The students’ reach has extended beyond the 
walls of the building—something very few students can look back 
and say about their law school years. In the scheme of civil rights 
advocacy, that is a lot of bang for the buck. These students may not 
have ripped the fabric of the social sky, but they have at least 
snagged a thread in its weave. 
                                                     
 124. Stashenko, supra note 123. Domestic violence litigants already have a 
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